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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GUARANTEEING
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN PENNSYLVANIA.
Freedom of speech and of the press has never been
curtailed by the common law, but in England and in some
of the American colonies, prior to the Revolution, the governing powers acted upon the assumption that such freedom is essentially dangerous to the state. The art of
printing particularly was for a long time looked upon
with much disfavor, and private persons could print only
under the supervision of a censor. In England until 1641
the printing press was regulated by the Court of the Star
Chamber, and after its destruction in the year mentioned
the function of licensing printers and censoring publications was performed under the supervision of Parliament
until 1694, although it never amounted to much after the
Revolution of 1688.1 There was not, however, any real
freedom of the press until a much later period, as under
the prevailing statutes the penalties for the publication
I See 4 B. Com. 152, note; Story on the Constitution, Vol. 2, 1 z882;
Cooly, Const. Lir., oh. x2.
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of matter of a scandalous nature, particularly if it reflected on the government, was severely punished. The
proceedings of Parliament were not allowed to be published at all until about the time of the American Revolution.1
There was little freedom of speech in America during
the early colonial days. The idea that men should not
be allowed free expression of their opinions about governmental matters especially could not be eradicated in
a day. The feeling that the printing press was a dangerous weapon, likely to promote sedition and rebellion
against proper authority, led to drastic measures against
indiscreet publishers in many colonies. In Massachusetts "licensers" were appointed a in Virginia printing
was at one time forbidden altogether ;4 even in the Quaker
Province of Pennsylvania a printer was compelled to flee
for publishing a paper written by a Quaker, criticising his
brethren who were in authority.5 On a number of occasions measures were taken to suppress books already
published, which were deemed to offend against public
authority.*
-As already suggested, these measures were not taken
by virtue of the common law, but at the instance of arbitrary powers. Comparative freedom of speech and of
the press would exist in the absence of anything done to
limit it. This was recognized by the framers of the
Constitutions of the United States and of the various
states, so that the constitutional phrases are usually so
framed as not to create freedom of the press, but to preserve it. Thus the first amendment to the Constitution
of the United States provides that Congress shall make
no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press. The
states, then, are left free to deal with the subject as they
please. All of them have adopted provisions similar in
3 May's Const. Hist., ch. 7, 9, 1o.
' x Hildreth Hist. U. S. 561.
4 Cooly, Const. Lim., ch. r2.

1 Hutch. Mass. 257 (2 ed.)
Hildreth Hist. U. S. 17?.
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effect to those of Pennsylvania, as hereafter- explained,
which are intended to guarantee to the citizens that freedom of speech and of the press which was sanctioned by
the common law.
The Pennsylvania Convention of 1776 adopted two
provisions which were intended to have the effect heretofore suggested, ch. x, § 12, "The people have a right
to the freedom of speech and of writing and publishing
their sentiments, therefore the freedom of the press ought
not to be restrained," and ch. 2, § 35, "The printing
presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to
examine the proceedings of the legislature or any part of
government." Both of these provisions, it will be observed, are intended not to extend but to preserve the
freedom of the press. Particularly was the right to criticise those in authority insisted upon, it being then realized
that the liberty of the people depends upon it.
The convention of 1 79o, in pursuance of their expressed
determination to define more accurately the rights guaranteed by the constitution, made certain alterations in
these provisions. The two clauses of the constitution of
1776 were consolidated into one and altered as follows:
"The printing presses shall be free to every person who
undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature
or any branch of government; and no law shall ever be
made to restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable
rights of man; and every citizen may freely speak, write
and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse
of that liberty. In prosecutions for the publication of
papers, investigating the official conduct of officers, or
men in a public capacity, or where the matter published
is proper for public information, the truth thereof may
be given in evidence; and, in all indictments for libels,
the jury shall have a right to determine the law and the
facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases."
Art. IX, § 7.
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The convention of 1873 made no change in the first two
sentences, but the third was stricken out, and in its place
was substituted the following: "No conviction shall be
had in any prosecution for the publication of papers relating to the official conduct of officers or men in public
capacity, or to any other matter proper for public investigation or information, where the fact that such publication was not maliciously or negligently made shall be
established to the satisfaction of the jury; and inall indictments for libels the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the
court, as in other cases."
Art. i, § 7.
The first two sentences in the sections relating to liberty
of the press in the constitutions both of 179o and 1873
consist of a declaration that private persons have an
inalienable right to speak, write and print on any subject, and particularly when engaged in the investigation
of the proceedings of the legislature or any branch of government.
No one will suppose that these provisions exempt any
person from liability for slanderous or libelous words.
This would be clear even in the absence of the qualifying
clause, "being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."
Their meaning is, that censorship of the press is forbidden,
and that under no circumstances can the legislature suppress a publication because of the general tone of its criticism. The publisher may be held responsible if he abuses
his privilege, but his right to publish is preserved inviolate.
As early as 1788, Chief Justice McKean, in Respublica v.
.Oswald, i Dallas 3r9, said: "What, then, is the meaning
of the Bill of Rights.and the Constitution of Pennsylvania,
when they declare 'That the freedom of the press shall
not be .restrained' and 'that the printing presses shall
be free to every person who undertakes to examine the
proceedings of the legislature or any part of the government?' However ingenuity may torture the expressions, there can be little doubt of the just sense of these
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sections: they give to every citizen a right of investigating the conduct of those who are entrusted with the
public business, and they effectually preclude any attempt
to fetter the press by the institution of a licenser. The
same principles were settled in England so far back as.the
reign of William the Third, and since that time, we all
know, there has been the freest animadversion upon the
conduct of the ministers of that nation. But is there
anything in the language of the constitution (much less
in its spirit -and intention) which authorizes one man to
impute crimes to another, for which the law has provided
the mode of trial and the degree of punishment? Can it
be presumed that the slanderous words, which, when
spoken to a few individuals, would expose the speaker
to punishment, become sacred, by the authority of the
constitution, when delivered to the public through the
more permanent and diffusfve medium of the press? Or
will it be said that the constitutional right to examine
the proceedings of government extends to warrant an
anticipation of the acts of the legislature or the judgments of the court? and not only to authorize a candid
commentary upon what has been done, but to permit
every endeavor to bias and intimidate with respect to
matters still in suspense? The futility of any attempt
to establish a construction of this sort must be obvious
to every intelligent mind. The true liberty of the press
is amply secured by permitting every man to publish his
opinions; but it is due to the peace and dignity of society
to inquire into the motives of such publications, and to
distinguish between those which are meant for use and
reformation, and with an eye solely to the public good,
and those which are intended merely to delude and
defame. To the latter description it is impossible that
any good government should afford protection and immunity." 7
7 See also Addison's Report, Appendix, p. 274 e seq. (1803); Res.
pub. v. Densie, x Yeates 267 (1805). Immoral publications, however
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All are agreed that clauses of this character forbid censorship, 8 and that this freedom from censorship does not
excuse licentiousness, but that if the words, when pub-'
lished, are libelous, they properly subject the publisher
to liability. There is, however, some difference of
opinion as to how far liability for spoken or written
words can be altered by the legislature. On the one
hand, it may be said that freedom to publish being
guaranteed, the constitution does not extend its protection further, and everyone runs the risk of being held
responsible for his words, whether that responsibility is
imposed by the common law or by legislative action; that
the constitution does not concern itself 'with what happens after the matter has been given to the public. In
other words, the publisher has full liberty to publish what
he pleases, but let him see to it that he does not transgress the law, written or unwritten.
Another view of this matter is possible and has obtained some recognition, viz., that the constitution not
only gives permission to publish, but guarantees immunity
from liability for such words as at common law were nonlibelous. It is said that "freedom of the press" would
mean nothing if the legislature, while not able to restrain
the printing, could pass laws which would inflict severe
penalties for the publication of words which, judged by
the standard of the common law, were innocent. The
difference between the two views is that under the former
the legislature can create new civil or criminal liability for
spoken or written words, whereas, under the latter, its
hands are tied; it cannot increase the common law
responsibility. This conception of the meaning of the
freedom of the press was advanced by Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, ch. 12. It has never been .the basis
may be suppressed, Com. v. Dowling, 14 Pa. C. C. 607 (1894), and probably those tending to provoke a breach of the peace could be also.
2 Story on the Constitution, i 1884. 1 1885; Hallam. Const. Hist.
2

of Eng., ch. x5; De Lohne, Const. of Eng. 254; 4 BI. Com. zz..
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of a judicial decision, as no law raising the point has had
its validity questioned on that ground.' This view, as
applied to the clause in the constitution of Pennsylvania
which provides that "the printing press shall be free"
and "'zo law shall ever be made to restrain the right" to
investigate the proceedings, ' .:ny branch of government,
seems logical and sound. If the legislature could at will
punish the publication of the result of such investigation
(either criminally or by establishing civil liability), then,
surely, the printing press would not be free. It follows,
that, a law establishing new liability in any such case (i.
e., where there has been a published investigation of any
branch of government), however slight the change might
be (e. g., a provision that negligence only and not malice
need be shown where the occasion is privileged) would
be contrary to the constitution, and hence of no effect.
As applied to the second sentence, guaranteeing freedom to any person to speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the "abuse" of that liberty,
there is more doubt. The solution of the question would
turn upon the construction of the word "abuse.", It
may with reason be contended that this clause is less
broad in its provisions than the preceding, and that the
'The Pennsylvania libel act of May 12, 1903, P. L. 349, may be
attacked upon this ground, and if so there may be a judicial determination of this important question. By the terms of that act civil liability
is created in a class of cases in which at common law there was no liability. It is provided that the publishers of newspapers shall be civilly
responsible in damages for all publications made without a careful
investigation into the facts. In other words, the test of liability in all
cases is negligence. This means that where the words have been
spoken upon a privileged occasion, the plaintiff to succeed need not
(as he must at common law) prove actual malice on the part of the
defendant, but that it is sufficient if he prove negligence only. It is
true that recklessness in publishing may be evidence of malice, but it
is not malice (in Briggs v. Garrett, xIx Pa. 404, mere failure to investigate was held no evidence of malice); hence the new act creates
liability in a class of cases in which at common law there was no liability. If Cooley's view should be adopted, the act may be declared
void as being contrary to the constitutional provisions under discussion.
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legislature may create new liability for words spoken
under any circumstances which may reasonably be construed as an "abuse" of the privilege of free speech.
Hence a provision, such as the one mentioned, making
one liable for words negligently published, even though
the occasion be privileged (not being an investigation of
any branch of government) and no malice, be shown,
might be upheld-the lack of due care being construed
But even under the latter clause the
as an "abuse."
legislature could not wantonly punish innocent words.
We now come to the consideration of the next sentence
in Section 7, viz.: "No conviction shall be had in any
prosecution for the publication of papers relating to the
official conduct of officers or men in public capacity, or
to any other matter proper for public investigation or
information, where the fact that such publication was
not maliciously or negligently made shall be established
to the satisfaction of the jury."
The first observation to be made concerning these
words is that they refer to criminal cases only. This is
clearly evident from the text and has been judicially
determined. 10 Unlike its predecessor, this clause does
not purport merely to guarantee an existing right, but,
on the contrary, to create a new one. Its language would
seem to imply that, in the absence of such a provision,
convictions could be had in such cases where the libel
was not malicious and not negligent.
In order to determine whether this be true, it is necessary to inquire as to the scope of the expression, "papers
relating to the official conduct of officers or men in public
capacity, or to any other matter proper for public investigation or information." At common law, libels pubThe
lished upon certain occasions are "privileged."
public welfare sometimes requires a disclosure of facts
the publication of which would otherwise subject the pub'

Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385 (1878)'
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lisher to criminal liability. The private injury is considered to be of less importance than the public good
resulting from the disclosure. Upon such occasions, even
though the publisher may have been entirely mistaken
in his facts, and the statement made be grossly false, yet
he is exonerated both civilly and criminally unless the
injured party can prove express malice. The publisher,
therefore, at common law, in giving out statements that
are privileged because of their character, warrants only
that he is acting from good motives and not on account
of personal spite. He does not warrant that the words
are true."1
If the cases mentioned in the constitution are, at common law, privileged, then the clause does not in fact
change the law, but is only declaratory of it, for even at
common law, upon a privileged occasion, there could be
no conviction unless the publication were maliciously
made.
There is no question that publications relating to the
official conduct of public men were at common law
privileged. Hence, in these cases, the co nstitutionaffords
no additional protection. 2 The latter pdrt of the clause
is much broader and includes all prosecutions for papers
relating to "any matter proper for public investigation
" Odgers, Libel and Slander, p. 197 et seq.. p. 436; Wharton, Crim.
Law, ? z629 et seq., Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23 (x8x$); S. C., 4 S. &
R. 420 (1819); Chapman v. Calder,14 Pa. 365 (z85o); Pittock v. O'Nei,
63 Pa. 253 (i869); Neeb v. Hope, iii Pa. 145 (1885); Briggs v. Garrett.
Ibid. 404 (r886); Press Co. v. Stewart, x19 Pa. 584 (1888); Conroy v.
PittsburgTimes, 139 Pa. 334 (1890); Com. v. Featherston,9 Phila. 594
(1874); Com. v. Smethurst. z6 Phila. 475 (z883).
12Odgers, Libel and Slander, p. 225. 226. The only doubt (if there
is any) that could be raised to this statement would be on account of
the expression "relating" to official conduct, etc. The constitution
of 1776, as we have seen, in providing that the truth might be given in
evidence, confined it to cases where there were prosecutions for papers
"investigating" official conduct. These are privileged without doubt.
It is not thought, however, that there is any essential difference in the
two expressions.
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or information."
There are no Supreme Court decisions
as to the scope of these words, and the common pleas
cases are not entirely in accord. The question first came
up before Judge Thayer in Philadelphia County. He
stated that the constitution had introduced "an entirely
new principle" into the law of libel, and from some passages of his remarks it might be inferred that he did not
then have in his mind the principle of criminal immunity
in cases of privilege at common law (where no malice was
shown), but it is probable that he did, and merely meant
to say that in that class of cases not privileged by the
common law and covered by the constitutional provision,
a new principle had been introduced.13 Judge Woodward
was of opinion that the constitution increases the cases
of privilege;"4 and this also seems to be the view of
Judges McPherson' s and Parsons."
There is some expression of opinion in the Superior
Court, but as the question has never been the basis of a
decision, there is not entire unanimity. In Shelly v.
Dampinan, I Superior I15 (1896), Wickman, J., at page
123, intimated that "privilege"
at common law and
under the constitution is not the same. On the contrarv, Rice, P. J., in Oles v. Pittsburg Times, 2 Superior
I3n (1896), at page 144, used language showing that he
deemed the very words of the constitution "proper for
public investigation and information," as the test of
privilege at common law.
If, in fact, all matter "proper for public investiga-

is
Com. v.

McClure, 3 W. N. C. 58 (1876).

In Com. v. Singerly, z

Phila. 368 (z88x), Judge Briggs evidently misinterpteted the law on

this point. He says that the new constitution made an innovation in
requiring proof of malice for the conviction of a defendant in any case.
This is clearly wrong.

"1Com. v. McClure, x Pa. C. C. 207 (i885); Com. v. Coon, 4 Pa. C. C.
422 (z886).

IsCom.v. Rudy, 5 D. R. 270 (z896).
10Com. v. Sanderson, 2 Clark 269 (1844), referring to the same words
in the constitution of 1790. See also the cases of Com. v. Costello, I

D. R. 745 (x892), and Com. v. Place, 153 Pa. 31S (1893).
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tion or information" is at common law privileged,
then, notwithstanding the dicta mentioned, no change
is in fact made by the new constitution. There are
many occasions which are privileged at common law, so
that no recovery or conviction can be had unless the
plaintiff or the commonwealth proves express malice.
The class most nearly approximating to the one defined
by the constitution is that comprising cases in which the
public has an interest in the disclosure. It is well settled
that if one person in good faith and with a proper motive
makes even a false statement to another about a matter
which affects the interest of both, he is protected. If the
subject-matter of the communication be one which concerns the welfare of the public at large, it is one in which
the public has an interest, and on the same principle any
member of the public making the statement in good faith
is protected. This includes any statement made in the
progress of a bona fide investigation .of the character or
fitness of a candidate for public office, or relating to the
official conduct of any public man. "Every communication is privileged which is made bona fide ....
to prevent or punish some public abuse. "17 This is perhaps the extent of such common law privilege. Whether
the cases contemplated by the Pennsylvania constitution
go beyond it, depends upon the construction which shall
ultimately be placed upon the word "proper."
If it
shall be construed to mean that cases "proper" for public information are those only in which the public has an
interest, then the constitution is only declaratory of existing law in this respect. If, on the other hand, it shall
be determined that there are cases where matter is proper
for public information, but which does not intimately
concern or affect the public welfare, then a new class of
cases where there may be criminal immunity has been
created. There are no cases in the books (after thirty
1?Odgers,

Libel and Slander, p.

tion). P. 33S.

225;

Pollock on Torts (Webb's Edi-
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years of experience under this constitution) where matter
which would not have been privileged at common law
has been determined to be within the scope of this clause.
On the other hand, there are numerous cases where the
contention has been made that it was proper for public
information, but where the contention has failed because
the matter did not in fact concern the public welfare. Thus, in Corn. v. Murphy, 8 Pa. C. C. 399 (t89o),
Judge Endlich, in rejecting the argument of counsel that
the facts concerning a man"s treatment of his stepdaughter were proper for public information within the
meaning of the constitution, said: "There are certain
occasions pointed out by the constitution where any private citizen or newspaper may publish the truth, or what
is honestly believed to be the truth, without being liable
to the individual for the injury done him, or to the commonwealth for any provocation for a breach of the peace.
There are occasions where the interest of the public to
know the truth is of more consequence (than) the possibility of its peace being disturbed by the publication of
that truth, and in those cases where the truth is disclosed
in a plain, unvarnished tale, without wrongful motive,
simply for the information either of private persons or
officials, who have a right to know it, or of the public that
has a right to know it, the fact that it is true or that it is
made upon reasonable ground of belief is a complete justification for its disclosure. Such publications are termed
privileged.

.

.

.

The subject-matter of this libel is

not one proper for public information and discussion.
Subjects that are proper for public information and discussion are only those in which the public has an interest.
The fact that a large number of people may have a private
interest in the matter will not make it a matter proper
for public investigation.

.

.

.

Nothing that happens

in the privacy of a man's family, short of a crime that
calls for public interference, can justify the publicity of
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accusations or comment in the columns of a news-

paper."

1

'This reasoning "and these sentiments seem sound, both
'logically and morally. All statements made upon occasions contemplated by the constitutional provision are
substantially privileged, even if at common law they were
not. To include in that class, as proper for public exploitation, statements about matters which only excite the
curiosity of the public, but in the truth of which it has no
interest, would be wholly inconsistent with a sane view
of the constitutional -guarantee. True liberty of the press
does not mean a license to circulate with impunity libelous statements about private individuals, It means that
the press or any individual may freely discuss matters
which vitally affect the public welfare, and may disseminate information which the public has a right to know,
even though it be untrue, warranting only their good
faith in so doing. Nothing can be "proper for public
investigation or information" unless it be of this character. The clause under discussion, therefore, merely
preserves the common law and forbids any future alteration by the legislature. It does not include any cases
not privileged at common law.1 '
We will now consider more particularly the latter part
of this clause, "Where the fact that such publication was
not maliciously or negligently made shall be established
, See also the opinion of Henderson, P. J., in Com. v. Brown, i D. R.
56S (1892).
19Hon. George M. Dallas, who fathered this constitutional provision

in the Convention of 1873, expre.sed his opinion that it made no
change in the law, as he understood it to be. -Hefavored the provision
to prevent future action by the legislature prejudicial to the freedom
of the press, and also because a recent decision in a quarter sessions
court had apparently disregarded the fixed principles of the common
law, as heretofore explained. He therefore felt it to be of the highest
importance that the matter should be settled. The decision he referred to has never been recognized as authority, so that the common
law of Pennsylvania is as he then thought it was and should be.
4 Debates 688 et seq.
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Assuming that the cases
to the satisfaction of the jury."
to which this language is applied are at common law
privileged, of course express malice must be proved in
order to convict, irrespective of the constitution. But
what is the meaning of the phrase, "or negligently"?
These words were inserted by amendment against the
protest of the promoters of the clause, after a long, tiresome debate, in which the true aspect of the law had been
almost lost sight of. Mr. Dallas, who had been the chief
sponsor for the clause all through the debate, expressed
his opinion that they mean nothing. Negligence may
be evidence of malice, but since the malice must be shown,
at all events the expression, "or negligently," is mere
surplusage.2 0
It has been intimated in some common pleas decisions
that in the cases covered by the constitution, the defendant may be convicted if it be shown that he is negligent,
21
This is not accurate. If
although there be no malice.
there be no proof of malice at common law, there can be
no conviction, if the occasion be privileged. Then, most
certainly, there cannot be if there be proof of negligence
only, unless that negligence in fact amounts to malice,
in which case the former supposition is incorrect. It may
Mr. Dallas, 5 Debates 589, says: "Before the vote is taken, I wish
to say that I have no objection to the amendment, except that it adds
two additional words, and unnecessary words, to the proposition.
What my friend from Carbon stated is precisely true, that if a man
negligently fires a pistol or throws a stone he is held liable, because the
law reasonably infers, from that negligence, malice. That is the only
reason. Negligence such as the amendment of the gentleman from
Allegheny comprehends would be in result malicious, and therefore I
think it unnecessary."
23 CoM. v. Singerly, x5 Phila. 368 (M88x); Com. v. McClure, 3 W.
N. C. 58 (1876); see also Corn v. Charnbers, i$ Phila. 425 (1882); Com.
v. McClure, i Pa. C. C. 207 (1885); Com. v. Costello, i D. R. 74S
See, however, the opinion
(189x); Com. v. Rudy, 5 D. R. 270 (189S).
of Judge Woodward in Com. v. Coon, 4 Pa. C. C. 422 (x886), and
that of Judge Allison in Com. v. Smethurst, 6 .Phila. 475 (1883),
apparently expressing the opposite view, viz., that malice must be

shown.
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be said that the constitution, by declaring there shall be
no conviction unless the publication be negligently made,
must be construed to create liability where such negligence is shown. This is not tenable, however. There
is no dispute that the entire purpose of this clause was
to diminish and not to increase liability for libelous publications. To turn a shield into a hostile sword would be
a violent and impossible construction of the provision.
Finally, how may this malice be shown? Upon whom
is the burden of proof? If the publication relates to
matter proper for public information, must the commonwealth affirmatively prove malice to convict, or is the
burden on the defendant to clear himself by showing no
malice-i. e., by proving his good faith and his reasonable
grounds for believing in the truth of the matter published?
At common law the burden was on the commonwealth.
The defendant, by showing that the publication'Avas made
upon a privileged occasion, rebutted the presumption of
malice created by the publication itself, and threw upon
the prosecutor the -duty of showing evil motive," and
unless some evidence more than the mere fact of publication was produced, the verdict necessarily had to be for
the defendant.2
As we have seen, the constitutional provision operates
only upon cases privileged at common law. The language of the clause "where the fact that such publication
was not maliciously or negligently made shall be established to the satisfaction of the jury," seems at first
thought to place upon the defendant the duty of proving
a negative. But this cannot be the true construction,
for we must remember that the clause was intended and
by its terms clearly shows that its sole purpose was to
guarantee immunity (if not to increase it) from criminal
convictions for libel in certain cases. But if we construe
Odgers, Libel and Slander, 270-271 , 330.

n Ibid., 273.
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it to lay upon the defendant the burden of proving his
own innocence, his good faith, lack of malice, etc., then
his criminal responsibility is increased and not diminished. This cannot, therefore, be the meaning of the
clause. The words do not require such an interpretation. They merely show that the question of malice is
to be left to the jury to be found as a fact, and the burden
is left where it properly belongs, on the commonwealth.
This i the only logical conclusion .possible. "The constitution preserves privilege in certain cases. The occasion:
being shown to be a privileged one, the presumption of
malice is rebutted, and the burden -f proving it naturally
falls upon the prosecutor. Malice is ar- essential elementof the crime of libel. In the absence of privilege, it is presumed as a legal conclusion. If.the occasion be privileged, there is no such presumption. Then, as in all other
cases, the animus, the essential element of the crime, must
be proven by the commonwealth. It would be a monstrous doctrine to require the defendant to prove himself
not guilty, when there is no presumption of his guilt from
facts already shown."
* It is hard to understand how any court could take the
opposite view of this question, so vitally concerning the
right of trial by jury, but there are a few common pleas
decisions and one in the Superior Court which seem to hold
that the defendant must, to make out his privilege, as
they say, affirmatively prove himself to have been-innocent of wrongful motive.'
,In the case of Cor. v. Sanderson, 2 Clark 269 (1844). Judge Parsons intimated that actual malice must be proven by the common-

wealth in all cases of criminal prosecutions for libel, whether the occasion be privileged or unprivileged. This is not the law. The mere
fact of publication where no excuse is offered implies malice, and it
need not be proven as a fact. Com. v. Murphy, 8 Pa C. C. 399 (z89o).
2 Com. v. Singerly, x$ Phila. 368 (x88z); Com. v. McClure, 3 W.
N. C. s8 (1876), and perhaps Corn. v. Chambers, z5 Phila. 4xS (882);
Com. v. Swallow. 8 Super. 539 (z898).
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On the other hand, there is a larger number of decisions.
which support the true rule as given above."
If evidence of malice be introduced, the defendant
in rebuttal may show that he made the publication in
good faith, honestly believing it to be true or that
in fact it was true. It must not be forgotten that
in criminal prosecutions for libel, the occasion being
privileged, the issue is malice or not malice. It has
been sometimes assumed, erroneously, that if the defendant proves his words to be true, he is exonerated.
This is a mistake. According to the common law a--in,
terpreted in England, the truth could not be shown in any
case; it was said to be no justification. Defamat'rywords, if true, were thought to be more likely to lead to
a breach of the peace than if untrue. "The greater the
truth, the greater the libel. "I? This was changed in England by Lord Campbell's Act, 6 and 7 Victoria, ch. 96,
making the truth always admissible in-mitigation of punishment, and making it a justification if the public welfare required its disclosure. In America the English view
of the common law on this point was not accepted in all
cases. It was ruled in most states, and among them in
Pennsylvania, that while the truth could never be a justification for a libel, yet it was always proper to be given in
evidence after conviction in mitigation of punishment;
and in cases of privilege, upon the trial, to show .lack
of malice. Perhaps the earliest case on record where the
truth was held admissible in a criminal prosecution for
libel at common law was that of The Proprietorv. George
Keith ef aL., Pennypacker's Colonial Cases, p. 1i 7 (i692).2'
' Respub. v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267 (t8o5); Com. v. Godshalk, 13
Phila. 575 (1877); Corn. v. Smethurst, x6 Phila. 47S (1883); Corn. v.
McClure, z Pa. C. C. 207 (1885); Con. v. Mellon & Porter, 29 W. N.
C. 433 (1892); Coin. v. Costello, i D. R. 74S (1892); Corn. v. Rudy, S
D. R. 270 (x896); Coin. v. M1ceser, x Brewst. 493 (t867).
Odgers, 437, Wharton Crim. Law, i x643, and cases there cited.
a See People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (1804). usually accredited
with being the first case in which the truth was admitted.
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Most of the states have specific provisions, either statutory or constitutional, concerning the admission of evidence to prove the truth.2
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In Pennsylvania, by Article

IX, Section 7, of the Constitution of 1790, it was provided,
that "in prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official conduct of officers or men in public
capacity, or where the.matter published is proper for pub"thereof may be given in evilic- information, tlit-th
This did f-Wrnqan. that the truth was ajustifiderice."
cation for the libel, but: irierely that it might be given in
evidencd in certain cases of privilege for the purpose of
rebutting evidence -of maliceetc. This clause probably
did not change, but was only declaratory of, the existing
common law.30 In the convention of 1873 it was not
thought necessary to reincorporate this sentence in the
constitution, and it was accordingly omitted. The rule
is, therefore, as at common law.
I As already indicated, the truth may not be given in
evidence unless the occasion be privileged.31 Upon other
occasions no public or private good can be accomplished
by circulating defamatory stories. In such cases the old
maxim, "The greater the truth, the greater the libel," is
and should be enforced. To revive old scandals long
since dead and circulate them about persons who may
have outlived early faults and be leading exemplary lives,
is certainly no less a crime than to tell that which is untrue. But when the occasion is privileged and the commonwealth has introduced evidence to prove express
malice on the part of the defendant, it is eminently proper
that the defendant should be allowed to show not only
that his words were proper for public information, but
that they were true, in order to rebut the evidence of
See Whart. Crim. Law, 1 z643, and notes.
30 See Whart. Crim. Law, ?x6 4 3 . A dictum in Corn. v. Sanderson,
2 Clark 54 (1844). seems to indicate that truth under the constitution
of 1790 may be a justification. This is a mistake.
31Runkle v. Meyer, 3 Yeates 5i8 (1803); Respub. v. Dennic, 4
Yeates 267 Cr805); Com. v. Brown, x D. R. 565 (1892).
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malice, and this in Pennsylvania is the common law.*
Nevertheless, even in such cases, the truth is not an absolute defense, for although the words be true and privileged, if they be spoken maliciously the defendant may
be convicted.u
The last sentence in the section under discussion is,
"And in all indictments for libels the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases." The purpose and
meaning of this provision become evident by a glance at
the evil in the common law procedure which it was designed to correct.. At common law, upon prosecutions
for libel, some cases held that the court must decide
whether the words were libelous as a matter of law, and
all that the jury could determine was whether the defendant published in the manner and form charged, and the
truth of the innuendo .' In other words, the jury was
2 Proprietorv. Keith et al., Penny. Col. Cas. z17 (1692); Runkle v.
Meyer, 3 Yeates 5x8 (i8o3); Respub. v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267 (18o).
See cases cited supra, in which the defendant (since the new constitution omitting the provision about proving the truth) was allowed to
show the truth in order to rebut the evidence of malice.
3
Wharton Crim. Laws, ix645. In New York and in various other
states there are provisions, either statutory or constitutional, to the
effect that the truth shall be a complete justification if the matter is
proper for public information. See Whart. Crim. Law, 1 643 (notes).
But such is not the law in Pennsylvania, where the truth maybe given
in evidence, but is not a justification. There was a short period during
which in Pennsylvania the truth in certain cases was, by statute, a
complete justification, but the act was allowed to expire by its own
limitation and has never been revived. Act of March z6, z8og. See
Com. v. Duane, i Binn. 6oz (z8o9). At the present time the act of
July x, z897, P. L. 204, is declaratory of the common law (as interpreted in Pennsylvania) in providing that the truth may be given in
evidence if the matter charged as libelous be proper for public information. Of course, if the matter be true and proper for public information, it is nearly impossible to prove actual malice; but if in any case
it should be done, a conviction must follow. Sometimes the manner
in which the publication is made, its headlines, etc., if in a newspaper,
are evidence from which malice may be inferred. Com. v. Scouton,
2o Super. 503 (1902); Com. v. Little, 12 Super. 636 (igoo).
31 Odgers, Slander and Libel, p. 94-
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deprived of the right, usual in criminal cases, of bringing
in a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. Judge Sharswood doubted whether this ever really was settled law,
and gave expression to these doubts in Kane v. Com., 89
Pa. 522 (18.79), but whether ever settled law or not, it
was deemed necessary in England to pass an act guaranteeing t6-the-j Ly this right, which was done in- 1792 by
Geq. III, c. 6o, usually known as" Mr. Fox's
the Act o
Act, ":---beaue he wasinstrumental in passing it. The
ear1Vi Pennsylvania courts seem to have been favorable
to allowing this right without a statute. In the colonial
case'heretofore mentioned the jury was allowed to determine whether the words published were seditious or not.'
In order, however, that all doubts might be set at rest,
the provision quoted above was inserted in the constitution of 179o and retained in that of 1873.
Its meaning is merely that the jury under judicial instruction may find the defendant guilty or not guilty. It
does not, however, give the jury any higher right than in
other cases. It has been suggested that the constitution
gives the jury the right not only to pass upon the question
of guilt or innocence as determined by the elements
present in the publication, but that it also gives them
the right to determine whether the occasion be privileged; for example, that the jury and not the judge is to
decide whether the matter is proper for public information."
This view is erroneous. The evil which the law was
intended to correct was only as to the right to decide
whether the words are libelous. It is so recognized in
all the cases. The decision as to whether or not an occasion be privileged has always belonged exclusively to the
court. This is so in civil as well as in criminal cases.
Keith ct al., Penny. Col. Cas. 117 (z692).
Com. v. Moore, 2 Chest. Co.
Rep. 358; Com. v. McClure, 3 W. N. C. 58 (x876); Com. v. Godshalk,
13 Phila. 575 (1877).

" Proprietorv.

3 Com. v. Paschall,8 Lanc. L. Rev. 37;
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The distinction between civil suits and criminal prosecutions in the function of the jury was sought to be corrected by Mr. Fox's act and by the constitution of 1790.
That this only was intended is clear from the expression,
"as in other cases." Judge Endlich, in a very able
opinion in Cmn. v. Costello, i D. R. 745 (1892), very effectually shows the fallacy of the views held by the courts
in the cases mentioned above. He points out among
other things that if the determination of what occasions
are privileged should be left to the jury, the "nowne
certaintie" of the law would be lost. It is proper that
the defendant's motives and purposes and the essential
effect of the alleged libel should in each case be decided
by the jury, but the court only is competent to say
whether the occasion is such as to justify the publication
and to rebut the presumption of malice.3
Thomas Raeburn Whie.

31 See also Respub. v Dennie, 4 Yeates

267 (18o5).

